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Diagnosing the Dutch Disease: Are the symptoms present in Bhutan? 
Nyingtob Pema Norbu1 
Abstract 
Bhutan’s economy has evolved significantly since embarking on a period of modern development in 
1960 when its first motor road was built. Underpinning its economic growth is the hydropower sector 
among other drivers, which has accounted for nearly 40% of exports on average in the last 5 years. 
However, the earnings thus far pale in comparison to what is projected with the completion of the 
recent massive surge in investments in the sector. The destabilizing effects of an unpreparedness to 
manage such inflows have already begun to manifest in the construction phase of Bhutan’s 
hydropower pursuits as evidenced by the recent balance of payments challenges. Hence, we can 
intuitively forecast the implications once these power plants are operational and export revenues 
surge exponentially. The academic consensus on the negative correlation between natural resource 
dependence and economic growth has been conceptualized in a framework known more popularly as 
the Dutch Disease. In this paper we attempt to technically assess whether the economy exhibits the 
symptoms associated with a Dutch Disease based on the three channels which include (1) the resource 
movement effect, (2) the spending effect and, (3) the monetary effect. Additionally, we also conduct 
an analysis of another important symptom- the Bilateral Real Exchange Rate- to ascertain whether it 
has been under pressure and the determinants of its movement. While we do find evidence of some 
of the symptoms such as real exchange rate appreciation, the estimates aren’t robust enough to 
categorically attribute these symptoms to power exports or a monetary disequilibrium in our 
framework. However, we argue that the traditional model may have to be tweaked slightly in our case 
because more traditional outcomes such as the resource movement effect probably manifest in 
different ways.  
Keywords: Bhutan, Dutch Disease, Real Exchange Rate, Energy Exports, Current Account 
JEL Classification Numbers: E60, O13, Q48 
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Introduction  
The hydropower sector forms the bedrock of Bhutan’s economy. Despite accounting for nearly 40% 
of exports on average in the last 5 years, the earnings are small in comparison to what is projected 
with the completion of Bhutan’s ‘Accelerated Hydropower Development Initiative’ which targets an 
installation of 10000 MW over the next decade. The investments in partnership with the Government 
of India are estimated to be as large as 50% of GDP in some years and upon completion will result in 
a 600% increase in electricity exports. In fact, the IMF projects that, when three of these projects 
become operational, Bhutan will become the fastest growing country in the world with a projected 
real growth rate of 11.3% (IMF, 2016).2 While this presents a unique development opportunity for 
Bhutan to propel itself to the ranks of higher middle-income status, it is crucial to also consider the 
potential adverse implications of such an energy-boom. The negative correlation between excessive 
dependence on natural resources and economic performance has been empirically documented. 
Sachs and Warner (1996) refer to it as the ‘natural resource curse’. Frankel (2011) explores six 
channels through which the effect occurs. In addition to macroeconomic and structural factors, 
studies also point to other undesirable outcomes such as rent seeking behaviour and corruption (Leite 
and Weidmann, 1999). 
While we can categorically conclude that the ‘resource curse’ due to corruption or institutional 
deficiencies has not resulted for Bhutan, we must ascertain whether the Dutch Disease has manifested 
through other channels. This study shall attempt to steer the debate by devising a more formal 
approach of analyses that is based on empirical rather than anecdotal evidence. Such an inquiry is 
critical at this juncture as we are at a macroeconomic crossroads and an objective assessment of the 
outcomes thus far will be insightful in formulating a prognosis for the impending energy boom. 
Notwithstanding the longer term impacts from power exports thus far, the destabilizing effects of an 
unpreparedness to manage elevated levels of inflows have also begun to manifest during the 
construction stage of the Accelerated Hydropower Initiative.3 With import growth outpacing export 
growth consistently, the increasing current account deficit with India which surged to -26.7% for the 
fiscal year 2011-12 continued its deterioration unabated, spurred by consumer credit and more 
significantly investment spending increases. This may be justified for an economy that hasn’t reached 
its long-term output potential as it requires investment and government consumption to exceed their 
steady state levels (Aristovnik, 2006). However, more enduring issues such as a lack of diversification 
as evidenced by a stagnant manufacturing sector and the economy’s excessive reliance on 
hydropower export revenue begs the question of whether or not growth in the energy sector has 
undermined the non-hydropower export sector through the usual transmission channels of the Dutch 
Disease. 
Hence the challenge in the longer term is managing an increase in natural resource export revenues 
to ensure that a “Dutch disease” effect or “resource curse” does not erode the competitiveness of the 
economy. There has been increasing interest in the study of Bhutan’s recent macroeconomic 
                                                          
2 This may have to be revised since the completion date has been pushed back. 
3 This is evidenced by the balance of payment challenges in 2011-2013 whereby the economy faced an acute shortage of Indian Rupee 
amid increased export earnings and capital flows from India. Despite these turbulences growth hovered at a respectable 8.6% for the 
period 2009-2012, mainly buoyed by hydropower investments and growth in services although it plummeted to a mere 2.5% in 2013. 
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turbulence. Ura (2015) delved into the Macroeconomic causes and consequences of the Rupee 
crunch, whereby he discussed dimensions ranging from a terms of trade deterioration, inflation 
decoupling and urbanization policy to heavy government investments and a ballooning government 
sector. Rashid (2012) argued that rupee inflows for hydropower development and revenues of SOEs 
left the banking sector awash with liquidity that led to a credit multiplier effect and a demand for 
rupee that was a multiple of the initial injection. Nidup (2015) provides a technical analysis adopting 
a SVAR framework and concludes that Government construction has a cascading effect on private 
credit leading to an excess demand for INR.4   
Objective and Structure 
The time period for this study goes beyond the recent period of turbulence and attempts to address 
some questions related to the structural evolution of the economy in the context of a heavy reliance 
on hydropower. Thus, we assess whether the economy exhibits the symptoms of the Dutch Disease 
using a more formal and empirical approach that was first pioneered by Naoko (2005). The paper is 
structured as follows. The first section delves into a literature review of the frameworks proposed to 
study the Dutch Disease phenomenon. This is then followed by an application of the technical 
approach to Bhutan’s case to diagnose the Dutch Disease condition. More specifically, we adapt the 
framework proposed by Naoko (2005) in her analysis of Bhutan’s power exports and the Dutch 
disease, and the seminal works of Corden (1984) and Edwards (1985). Based on their proposed 
frameworks we verify whether the resource movement and spending effect along with the monetary 
disequilibrium channels suggest existence of the symptoms. Using more recent data and hindsight, 
this is complemented by an analysis of Bhutan’s Real Exchange Rate and the determinants of its 
movements. The final section then concludes by offering policy recommendations and areas for 
further research.  
A primer on the Dutch Disease 
The literature surrounding the Dutch Disease has evolved significantly. Sachs and Warner (1996) in an 
empirical investigation find a significant inverse relationship that is robust even when controlling for 
variables like initial per capita income, trade policy, government efficiency, investment rates etc. 
Corden and Neary (1982) pioneered the formulation of a formal framework that captures the 
dynamics between the traded booming sector, lagging sector and the non-traded sector. Frankel 
(2012) explores six channels through which the resource curse occurs: (i) long-term trends in world 
prices, (ii) price volatility, (iii) permanent crowding out of manufacturing, (iv) autocratic/oligarchic 
institutions, (v) archaic institutions, and (vi) cyclical Dutch Disease. 
Most attempts to diagnose the condition still refer to the seminal work of Corden and Neary (1982) 
and Corden (1984). The authors develop a framework comprised of three sectors: the booming natural 
resource sector which is also tradable, the lagging tradable sector which is manufacturing in this case 
                                                          
4 The rupee episode was unprecedented in Bhutan’s macroeconomic trajectory. Some of the administrative measures adopted to stem 
the outflow of INR were rather extreme such as the suspension of vehicle imports and the imposition of a moratorium on the extension of 
credit. While these actions may have seemed necessary given the limited space for monetary and fiscal instruments, it must be 
understood that these are only temporary measures and more sustainable solutions need to be adopted. In the Real Sector, the 
phenomenon has provided an ideal platform and motivation for microeconomic reform to unleash growth in the private sector. On the 
monetary front, while technical capacities to manage liquidity and international reserves are paramount, a primary concern involves the 
cornerstone of Bhutan’s monetary policy and its sustainability: the one-on-one peg between the Ngultrum and INR (Rashid, 2012). 
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and the non-tradable services sector. They then demonstrate how a boom due to higher prices attracts 
factors, assuming inter-sector mobility, to the booming oil sector away from manufacturing resulting 
in the “Resource Movement Effect”. The second effect called the “Spending Effect” occurs simply due 
to more income accruing from natural resources and consequently resulting in a higher aggregate 
demand. As more spending occurs, imports rise in response to an increase in demand for tradable; 
however, the increased demand for non-tradables such as services in the short run is re-equilibrated 
with an upward adjustment of prices. This appreciation in the real exchange rate leads to a loss of 
competitiveness. The technical details are deferred to subsequent sections. 
However, this framework has been criticized for its static approach by some authors like Bjornland 
and Thorsrud (2014) who point out that a limitation of the traditional Dutch Disease model is the 
assumption that productivity is exogenous to the model. They instead propose a model that 
accommodates spill-over effects and hence learning by doing. The authors provide the example of the 
development of offshore oil that requires technological solutions, which itself could generate positive 
knowledge externalities. Such an argument could be made for Bhutan where hydropower results in 
spill-over effects to construction and geo-mechanical engineering as well. However, we restrict our 
framework to the more conventional static models. 
Despite the abundance of conceptual frameworks most studies are still unable to reach a definitive 
conclusion of the existence of a Dutch Disease. For instance, Kutan and Wyzan (2005) conclude 
through an adaptation of the Balassa-Samuelson model, that the symptoms of the Dutch disease are 
significant in Kazakhstan. However, Egert & Leonard (2006) find that while the real exchange rate has 
been appreciating in the case of Kazakhstan, non-oil manufacturing had been preserved from the 
perverse effects of oil price increases. Similarly, while an assessment for the Russian economy by 
Westin (2004) indicated the existence of the symptoms but not a full-blown disease, Latsis (2005) 
concluded that the economy exhibited all the classical symptoms. In this study we also intend to 
present an objective assessment of the symptoms rather than a definitive conclusion. 
Nevertheless, a discussion of the Dutch Disease is incomplete without understanding the longer run 
adverse implications of the resource movement effect, especially away from manufacturing. The rise 
of manufacturing is associated with structural changes in the world economy and sustained increases 
in the growth of labour productivity and economic welfare. It creates “special opportunities for reaping 
economies of scale, engaging in technological progress and learning, profiting from spill-overs to other 
sectors and providing job opportunities for variously skilled levels of labour” (Naude & Szirmai, 2012). 
Hence, ensuring that sectors like manufacturing are not permanently crowded out assumes 
importance. 
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Source: Author’s plot based on data from WDI 
Excessive dependence on natural resources is also associated with high volatility. Reduction of growth 
volatility is critical as volatility is empirically associated with lower long-run growth rates (Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995) as well as private investment (Aizenman and Marion, 1999). Furthermore, resource-
dependent economies are more vulnerable to such growth volatilities due to low-price elasticities of 
supply associated with natural resources (Oomes and Kalcheva, 2007) and price volatility (Frankel, 
2012).  
Diagnosing the Dutch Disease 
In this section we undertake a formal investigation of the symptoms associated with the Dutch 
Disease. While the theoretical framework of the classical Dutch Disease model proposed by Corden 
and Neary (1982) distinguish between a resource movement and a spending effect, Naoko (2005) 
described an additional channel through which a Dutch disease could manifest- a monetary effect. We 
adopt a similar technical framework of analyses and apply it to an updated data set. Most importantly 
we follow Naoko’s approach to studying the determinants of the bilateral real exchange rate between 
the Ngultrum and the Rupee.  
Before delving into the technical details, it is worthwhile highlighting a few specificities that may 
require a slight tweaking of the classical model to analyse Bhutan’s case. First, the price of energy 
exports is determined bilaterally in a monopsonistic context with the Government of India and thereby 
insulated from any swings in international energy prices. The tariffs are revised periodically and hence 
the transmission channels of a boom are usually the expansion of installed energy capacity as opposed 
to favourable terms of trade movement. Second, the projects are financed entirely by capital inflows 
from India and undertaken on an Inter-Governmental basis thereby mitigating some of the capital 
crowding out effects. Finally, a significant share of the labour requirements, both manual and 
technical, is sourced from India suggesting that the industry operates along the lines of an enclave 
sector. 
i. The Spending Effect 
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The spending effect occurs as the result of an increase in natural resource-based export revenues. This 
leads to either an increase in consumption or investment or both, usually underpinned by receipt and 
expectations of higher income. This raises aggregate demand in the economy and to the extent that 
some of this increased demand is directed towards domestically produced goods and services for 
which supply cannot be increased instantaneously, prices will rise. The prices of traded goods and 
services remain unaffected as they are determined at an international level. This also induces a real 
exchange rate appreciation as the relative price of non-tradable to tradable goods and services rises. 
In a more formal and detailed analysis, Naoko refers to Gelb’s (1986) approach to detect whether or 
not the symptoms of a spending effect exist for the period 1980 to 2001. The objective of the method 
is essentially to decompose the absorption of power export earnings into government and private 
consumption and investment.5  
Naoko’s calibration of absorption of power export revenue by the Bhutanese economy reveals this 
effect as being particularly strong for the private sector. She observes that the demand for both traded 
and non-traded goods have increased leading to higher imports as well as the relative price of non-
traded goods since capacity to increase production of non-traded goods is limited. In particular, there 
are two distinct periods where private sector absorption peaks in 1988 and 1999 following surges in 
power export revenue.6  
We follow a similar approach with a slightly different dataset and timeframe. For the period 
investigated by Naoko, our calibration yields generally similar results. What we observe in the period 
beyond that investigated by Naoko is a stable consumption of power income from 2001 to 2007, which 
then spiked immediately following the commissioning of the 1020 MW Tala Hydropower Project. 
Hence there are 3 distinct spikes in absorption of power income by private consumption which are 
again associated with hydropower export revenues. The first spike beginning in 1987 was financed by 
the commissioning of the Chukha Hydropower Project followed by an upward tariff revision in 1999, 
and finally a significant increase following the completion of the Tala Hydropower - the largest 
hydropower project. We also observe that channelling of power investment for income has been 
increasing over time as well following trends similar to that of consumption. 
                                                          
5 This is derived by the following calculation: 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑖 = [(
𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑡
) − (
𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑡−𝑃𝑌𝑡
)],  
Where 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑖 = {
Government consumption of power income if it = Government Consumption;
Private consumption of power income if it = Private Cosumption;
Investment absorption of power income if it = Investment
 
𝑌𝑡 is GDP and 𝑃𝑌𝑡 is electricity’s share of GDP. 
6 An assessment of credit trends also corroborates the private sector’s optimistic spending outcomes as credit growth averaged 23% over 
the last 13 years. 
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Source: Author’s plot adapted from Naoko (2005) 
Moreover, as opposed to the period investigated by Naoko it is encouraging to note that investment 
absorption of power income has been increasing faster than consumption. This is consistent with the 
government’s move towards financing an increasingly larger share of public investment through 
domestic resources. Recently the Government has been able to finance its entire recurrent 
expenditure and a portion of its capital expenditure through internal resources, thereby financing 60 
percent of its entire expenditure (National Budget, 2015-16). As an aspiration for the 11th Five Year 
Plan and an indicator towards the pursuit of self-reliance the Government set a target to finance 85% 
of its expenditure by the year 2019 (GNHC, 2014). Hence, we can reasonably expect yet another spike 
once the projects under construction begin generation. 
In addition to the Government’s contribution to aggregate investment, private investment has also 
been increasing rather rapidly as evidenced by lending activity, especially towards the real estate 
sector. This effect is particularly significant for Bhutan. As Kalcheva and Oomes (2007) also emphasize 
that, unlike the resource movement effect which occurs only if factors are sufficiently mobile between 
sectors, the spending effect occurs regardless of such conditions.  
ii. The resource movement effect 
The other outcome of the Dutch Disease is a reallocation of resources that may in the longer-term be 
sub-optimal. Corden and Neary (1982) define the real exchange rate as the relative price of Non-
traded to traded. When a boom occurs in a sector like energy, the marginal product of labour increases 
and draws resources (assuming factor mobility) from other sectors requiring adjustments through the 
real exchange rate. The resource movement effect, while initially driven by the tradable booming 
sector’s higher returns, is also influenced by the spending effect. Through increased demand for non-
traded goods this leads to an increase in its relative price and movement of resources towards the 
non-traded service sector. 
 
 
 
-1
1
3
5
7
9
11
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
%
 o
f 
N
o
n
-h
yd
ro
 G
D
P
Composition of Absorption
Power absoprtion govt Power abosrption private
Power absorption invest
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Corden (1984) 
This can be captured graphically in the above diagram. We begin where production possibilities are 
bounded by T1 and NT of traded and non-traded goods and services respectively. The initial equilibrium 
is at point ‘a’. The curve ‘On’ represents the demand for non-traded goods and services at the initial 
relative prices. A boom results in the frontier moving outwards but pivoted from NT as the supply 
possibilities of non-traded goods and services are still constrained. With an unchanged real exchange 
rate and assuming labor is mobile this results in equilibrium at point ‘b’. However, since the booming 
sector in Bhutan does not absorb and require much labor we tweak the model to reflect this. This is 
consistent with Corden and Neary’s explanation that if the booming sector uses relatively less 
resources that can be drawn from elsewhere in the economy, the major effect is through the earlier 
spending effect. This is perhaps true in the case of Bhutan where the capital and labour resources for 
hydropower are primarily sourced from India and the impacts are due to spill-over spending effects in 
other sectors from increased hydropower export revenues.  
Hence production of non-traded goods and services does not change as in the conventional model 
where the booming sector draws factors out of the non-traded sector resulting in an initial decline in 
non-traded output. In our adaptation we end up at the sub-optimal point ‘d’ where instead of a 
tangency we achieve an intersection of the budget constraint and production frontier. An excess 
demand for non-traded goods and services is visible as ‘On’ intersects the new frontier at point ‘c’. To 
increase production or availability of non-traded goods and services its relative prices rise, and we 
ultimately end up at point ‘e’. 
Moving from the conceptual framework to empirical evidence, most studies simply analyze trends in 
each sector’s contribution to GDP. Typically, an outcome consistent with the theoretical dynamics of 
the Dutch Disease would involve declining manufacturing output and a growing services sector. We 
analyze the trend in services and manufacturing from the earliest year in which data is available. 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
O Non-Traded 
Traded 
T1 
T2 
NT 
n 
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Interestingly, the share of services in 1981 was already as high as 42% of GDP. This is perhaps 
consistent with the findings of Naude and Szirmai (2012) whereby they note that the “pattern of 
structural change in developing countries differs radically from the traditional patterns of structural 
change, in which the rise of industry precedes that of the service sector. [Furthermore] this is in line 
with the Gerschenkronian observation that latecomer patterns of structural change are not simple 
copies of earlier experiences.” In Bhutan’s case even this may be an underestimation since a huge 
proportion of the services sector is informal as in most developing countries, and hence unrecorded. 
This is further compounded by the sharply increasing value of land in an economy with a narrow range 
of investment avenues. The non-traded sector could be represented in such a case by the market for 
land and more importantly location-specific land. Although no consistent time series for real estate 
exists, the sharply increasing price of land can be gauged from the rate of urbanization and 
construction activities.  
In terms of the manufacturing sector’s performance, we find no evidence that there has been a 
contraction to the extent that it could be diagnosed as a resource movement effect. In fact, 
manufacturing has grown from about 5% in 1981 to about 9% today, although most of the growth was 
achieved in the early nineties and has plateaued since then. This can perhaps be attributed to the 
synergy between the manufacturing sector and the energy sector, whereby most manufacturing in 
Bhutan is concentrated in the power-intensive segment such as steel, ferro-silicon and cement. For 
instance, the commissioning of the first mega hydropower plant in 1987 was accompanied by 2 growth 
spurts in the manufacturing sector as competitively priced energy became abundantly available. A 
counter argument is whether the manufacturing sector could have been more vibrant had the Dutch 
Disease not manifested. As already mentioned, the sector functions like an enclave sector and hence 
does not crowd out other private investments in manufacturing so the counterfactual is unlikely and 
other factors such as energy supply saturation and an enabling business environment are more 
instrumental in explaining the stagnation. 
While it is difficult to verify the movement of labour due to unavailability of data, an observation of 
the trends in sectorial contribution to GDP and export also do not support the hypothesis of a 
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significant resource movement effect. Other sectors have grown in prominence indicating that real 
appreciation of the Ngultrum has not led to a contraction of the tradable sector relative to the non-
tradable sector. Nevertheless, this could have been due to factors such as the immobility of labour 
and the capital-intensive nature of the booming hydropower sector that does not employ much labour 
upon completion. It could also be argued that the resource movement effect for labour has been 
unfolding in a slightly unconventional path whereby the civil service has been growing exponentially 
at an average of about 5% over the last 12 years (Second Pay Commission, 2014) to the extent that 
the civil service is the largest formal employer in the country. This is not inconceivable considering 
that a significant portion of the gains from hydropower are also channelled towards financing the 
recurrent expenditure of the Government. Moreover, historically tariff revisions have been pursued 
to finance upward pay revisions for civil servants. Ura (2015) also argues that such increases in wages 
and salary has been largely responsible for the fiscal expansion that also leads to wage push inflation. 
Relative to the private sector the civil service is still considered an attractive option and has absorbed 
most of the new human capital thus far although there has been no reallocation in the theoretical 
sense of the model. 
Regardless of the manifestation of the resource movement effect, it results in an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. Corden and Neary (1982) also explain that although “when the two effects 
combine, we see that both contribute to a real appreciation…However, the resource movement effect 
tends to lower the output of services whereas the spending effect tends to raise it, and there is no 
presumption as to which will dominate.” Based on our explanation of the insulated nature of the 
hydropower sector and the immobility of labour, we can reasonably infer that the spending effect is 
stronger than the resource movement effect for Bhutan. 
iii. The Monetary Effect 
The final and lesser diagnosed symptom known as the monetary effect occurs when unsterilized 
inflows due to an export boom leads to monetary expansion and excess liquidity. Such effects are 
usually temporary, and the monetary disequilibrium is a result of short-run money supply exceeding 
long-run money demand. The adjustment risk is that this eventually causes inflationary pressures to 
build thereby affecting competitiveness. About 2 years before Bhutan experienced its most significant 
energy boom in absolute terms with the completion of the Tala hydroelectric project, Naoko (2005) 
presented several cautionary assessments that have unfolded with a fair level of precision. She 
cautioned that “While the excess liquidity has not posed a significant problem to date, risks are that it 
could at some stage provide the basis for rapid increase in bank lending, in turn putting pressure on 
foreign reserve levels and the rupee-ngultrum peg itself.” We abstract from the deterioration of 
reserves and limit our discussion to the inflationary pressures that may have resulted due to the 
monetary disequilibrium. Excess and volatile liquidity has been a characteristic of the financial sector. 
This has perhaps played a role in fuelling a credit boom, especially towards personal consumption and 
real estate, thereby exerting pressure on the relative price of the non-traded sector. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime like that of the Rupee-Ngultrum the transmission channels of 
increased energy export revenues differ from that of a floating exchange rate regime. In the latter the 
principal channel is an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate spurred by increasing demand for 
the local currency. In the case of the former, inflationary pressures sparked by an expansion in the 
money supply leads to an upward pressure on the real exchange rate thereby effecting 
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competitiveness despite a fixed exchange rate regime. While the real appreciation of the Ngultrum is 
inevitable as Bhutan harnesses its natural resource endowments, it is the speed of appreciation that 
needs to be managed.  
Hence, it is noteworthy that M2 growth which averaged 22% from 1983 till 2010 has consistently 
outpaced the growth rate of nominal GDP which averaged 15% in the same period. While this would 
have resulted in high inflationary pressures, it was also accompanied by a declining velocity of money. 
For instance, from 1983 to 2015 the speed at which money was circulating steadily declined 
counterintuitively from 5.15 to 1.7 despite a consistent increase in credit relative to GDP overtime.7 
These could be due to a variety of explanations such as the low levels of monetization relative to GDP 
which was much lower in the 1980s thereby resulting in each unit of currency supporting more activity. 
 
Rashid (2012) also observes that demand deposits which provide short term liquidity as a share of 
total deposits have been increasing providing incentives for shorter term lending. It is probable that 
such lending directed towards import intensive activities do not necessarily contribute to GDP growth 
significantly whereas they result in an expansion in the money supply. These deposits can probably be 
attributed to the transactions of the State-Owned Enterprises which are significant relative to the size 
of the economy.8 Hence the new money created towards such transactions do not circulate in the 
economy as much as money created for other transaction with higher levels of domestic content. This 
can also perhaps be reconciled with the relatively high Import elasticity of growth whereby most 
money is being used to finance import-intensive activities resulting in lower levels of circulation but 
ultimately a higher level of credit. 
While the significance of the impact of monetary disequilibrium is debatable, precaution must be 
exercised as Bhutan positions itself to harness an exponential surge in inflows in the medium term. To 
mitigate the adverse consequence of such effects Naoko and other studies recommend either 
                                                          
7 The Velocity of money is the number of times a unit of currency changes hands in the economy. It can be calculated as V=GDP/M. For 
more on the evolution of the velocity of money refer to Bordo and Jonung (1989) where the authors discern a U-shaped evolution of 
velocity. Monetization is associated with a declining velocity and financial sophistication and economic stability account for the upward 
trend. 
8 For instance, in 2015 the total assets held under the SOE holding company DHI amounted to 117% of GDP and income for the year stood 
at approximately 30% of GDP. 
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sterilizing such inflows or maintaining some of the export income offshore through a savings fund. The 
impact of such disequilibrium on the bilateral real exchange rate is also discussed in greater detail in 
the next section through a more systematic approach. Hence, we’ve assessed the trends in the 
economy through the lenses of the three effects and we’ve observed that the spending effect tends 
to dominate in our case. We now turn our attention to analysing the evolution of the Bilateral Real 
Exchange Rate between Bhutan and India since the Dutch Disease as already discussed also manifests 
ultimately through an appreciation of the BRER. 
The Bilateral Real Exchange Rate  
This section delves into a more formal and technical assessment of the Dutch disease by analysing the 
evolution of the bilateral real exchange rate and identifying its most significant determinants. 
Theoretically, the bilateral real exchange rate can be defined in two ways. The first which is referred 
to as the purchasing power parity approach simply adjusts the nominal bilateral exchange rate with 
the ratio of the foreign price level to the domestic price level.  The second approach defines the 
exchange rate as the relative price of traded and non-traded goods, which essentially serves as an 
indicator of a country’s competitiveness level in foreign trade (Kesreyli and Kipici, 2000).9  
To track price movements and their implications for the Bilateral Real Exchange Rate with India, Naoko 
emphasized the preference of the WPI (Wholesale Price Index of India) over the CPI. This is primarily 
on account of the trade-intensive composition of the WPI basket as opposed to the CPI, which includes 
non-traded items such as services. The author perhaps was referring to the relative price approach for 
which the former is more relevant in estimating the bilateral real exchange rate. However, we use 
both indices to extract any significant deviation between the two analyses. 
                                                          
9 For our purpose, this ratio is defined as follows: 𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝑈,𝐼𝑁𝑅 =  
(𝐶𝑃𝐼,𝑊𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑁𝑅)
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝑁𝑢  
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Source: Author based on data from WDI, RMA, NSB and MFCTC 
The sharp appreciations in the initial period from 1980-1984 despite the absence of any spike in power 
exports could probably have been a result of significant capital inflows for hydropower related 
construction.10 Given the small base and undiversified nature of the economy, the inflows would have 
had a rather amplified spill-over effect for non-traded as well as traded goods and services.11 We then 
observe a sustained appreciation of the real exchange rate that defies the gradual increases in real 
power exports till 2000. However, the trend reverses after 2000 and real exchange rate begins to 
depreciate, and the trend stabilizes after 2004 witnessing another episode of steep appreciation after 
2011. This coincides with the year of the period of imbalances that preceded the INR crunch and when 
annual credit growth was hovering at the 30% mark for the 3 previous years. It also coincides with the 
period when construction of the new Power Projects commenced. While it is challenging to 
disentangle the determinants of the real exchange rate’s behaviour in the graph, but we can infer a 
broadly inverse relationship between real exchange rate and real power exports. Given the rapidly 
evolving nature of the Bhutanese economy, it is possible that other factors may have had an offsetting 
effect thereby masking the true impact of increased power exports on the real exchange rate. For 
instance, the surge in real power exports following the commissioning of the Tala hydropower project 
in 2007 should intuitively suggest an appreciation of the Real Exchange Rate, whereas we only observe 
a stabilization followed by a mild appreciation. This could have occurred due to some deflationary 
forces such as the alleviation of numerous supply side bottlenecks relating to import of goods and 
services although the details would require an investigation of their weights in the CPI basket. On the 
contrary Ura (2015) expresses concerns over the composition of the consumption basket and the 
associated weights for the CPI suggesting that they potentially underestimate inflation. While these 
are all valid possibilities, an in-depth exploration is beyond the scope of this study and provides an 
                                                          
10 A downward trend of the blue line implies appreciation and vice versa. 
11 To put into perspective, annual inflows during the construction phase of the Project would have averaged 26% of GDP, a large number, 
by any standard. 
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intriguing subject for further research. For this study we restrict our focus to the general trends 
observed in the data and take their reliability as given.12 
 
 
Source: Author based on data from WDI, RMA, NSB and MFCTC 
It is interesting to note that the bilateral real exchange rate is a lot more volatile when using the PPP 
approach. Contrary to the previous approach, we actually observe a gradual depreciation after 1992. 
Historically, Bhutan’s inflation rate has mirrored that of India’s as is apparent from the fairly high level 
of correlation portrayed below. In fact, this relationship is stronger than that between the WPI and 
CPI of the two countries which at first appears counter-intuitive given that nearly 80% of Bhutan’s 
total imports come from India and these would be more accurately reflected through the WPI. This 
could possibly be due to the highly integrated nature of the two economies with a significant presence 
of labour from India in Bhutan. We also observe a reliable degree of co-movement between the two 
indices till 2008 after which the relationship is less singificant. Hence, in studying the bilateral real 
exchange rate and its determinants we refer to both indices for a more comprehensive explanation. 
                                                          
12 Given the paucity of data and break in series for a number of indicators we have drawn from multiple data sources introducing some 
adjustments where anomalies exist such as in the WDI data for inflation. 
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Source: NSB and RBI 
The Model 
Having assessed the movement of the real exchange rate, we now assess it’s within a formal model, 
using the approach proposed by Naoko (2005) and other studies such as that by Edwards (1985). 
However, we make some adjustments and use a more recent dataset.  
Determinants of the Bilateral Real Exchange Rate 
There has been a recent explosion in the literature surrounding the determinants of exchange rates 
given that it is the key ‘relative price’ in international finance (Chinn, 2006). The determinants of 
exchange rate can be bifurcated into the longer-term fundamentals and shorter term monetary 
variables. Williamson (1994) proposes a fundamental equilibrium exchange rate approach which 
involves calculating the real exchange rate that equates the current account at full employment with 
sustainable net capital flows. Chinn (2000) explores the effect of productivity on real exchange rates. 
Hsieh (1982) deduces that faster productivity growth in the traded sector leads to an appreciation. 
While a range of approaches have been proposed, most country level analyses contextualize the 
framework to include the most relevant determinants. We largely adapt the framework used by Naoko 
which can be captured by the following equations. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡 = 𝜎0 + 𝜎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑡
𝑃 + 𝜎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑡
𝑁 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡 + 𝜎4𝑒𝑡−1 − 𝜌(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑠 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑑 ) + 𝜀𝑡… (3) 
The determinants of the equilibrium BRER are expressed in terms of real power exports (xp), 
government expenditure on non-traded goods (GN), net foreign aid (ODA) and the divergence between 
the lagged value of short run money supply (𝑀𝑡−1𝑠 ) and long-run money demand (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1𝑑 ). The 
specification allows us to capture the longer term as well as shorter term determinants of real 
exchange rate behaviour. 
Regression Results 
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As highlighted earlier, we run the model with 2 different indices that capture the PPP approach and 
the relative price approach. To execute the former, we use the CPI of India and Bhutan; for the latter 
we use the WPI of India and CPI of Bhutan.  
Model 
A (WPI) B (CPI) 
Sample: 1983-2015 Sample: 1983-2015 
Coefficient T- Statistics Coefficient T- Statistics 
C 0.005332 0.309862 -0.039143 
 
-1.403967 
LOG(REXCH_WPI(-1)) 0.830742 9.888146 0.895585 10.28008 
LOG(RPOWEXP) -0.006279 -1.749643 -0.007086 
 
1.565615 
dLOG(GOVCONS)   0.011512 
 
2.025166 
LOG(RM1(-1))-LOG(RM1_F(-1)) 0.066506 2.140425 -0.018037 -0.552404 
Outlier1 0.060438 2.499768 -0.048093 -2.165574 
Outlier2 -0.072184 -3.296093 0.051707 2.329675 
R-squared  0.917089 
 
 0.906111 
 
The variables are all stationary when the unit root tests are specified with a constant. In model A we 
obtain the expected negative signs for real power export but not for the monetary disequilibrium 
term, which is significant. Real Power Exports are significant at the 10% level, and the other are 
significant at the 5% level. Since Net ODA and government consumption do not yield significant 
estimates we drop them from the regression. When replacing the WPI with the CPI approach, the 
model yields significant estimates only for the parameter for government consumption and the lagged 
value of the exchange rate. However, the sign for the monetary disequilibrium term is negative. 
Hence, we primarily focus on the results from the model that adopts the relative price of traded to 
non-traded goods and services approach. 
 
Implications of the estimates: 
 
The estimation exercise suggests that fundamental and monetary factors do determine the evolution 
of the BRER. While, most of the variation is explained by the previous period’s exchange rate, the 
changes in real power exports also explains some of the variation, although it is much more muted 
than that estimated by Naoko. The model suggests that a 1 percent increase in real power exports 
leads to a .006 percent appreciation in the BRER; although this is less than Naoko’s result of .04 
percent. This could be due to a couple of factors besides the shorter time period from 1983 to 2002 
analysed in her study when the impacts from earlier investments in hydropower would have been 
magnified. Perhaps the diversification of the economy’s structure whereby the electricity sector’s 
share has been decreasing compared to the time period when it was steadily increasing in her sample 
period. For instance, real power exports have actually been declining since peaking at 2007 as no new 
power projects have been commissioned although we can expect this trend to reverse sharply 
following the completion of the projects that are currently under construction. Nevertheless, these 
crude estimates still imply that the 10000 MW initiative which would result in an almost 500 percent 
increase in power capacity and associated exports would cause a BRER appreciation of 3 percent. 
However, it must be qualified that this is only in the context of the model and actual outcomes could 
perhaps be significantly higher given the ambitious speed at which energy capacity expansion would 
take place. In the context of the model, the impacts of hydropower exports on the real exchange rate 
are spread over many years and hence, the medium-term effects are probably underestimated in this 
17 
 
model. If we were to use Naoko’s estimates which were reported for a shorter time frame, such a 
surge in power exports would imply a crippling 20 percent appreciation. 
 
However, the most significant impact, despite its unexpected sign, comes through the channel of a 
monetary disequilibrium effect with a 1 percent increase leading to a .066% depreciation. While we 
theoretically expect this sign to be negative since an excess of money supply over money demand 
would result in inflationary pressures, we obtain the reverse in our case. This could be due to a number 
of reasons that range from the data or some genuine causal factors that we haven’t been able to 
capture. Perhaps the linkage between monetary expansion and inflation is not as robust in Bhutan 
considering that a significant amount of inflation is imported. Only recently we began to expand the 
set of domestic goods and services in the consumption basket. Moreover, as highlighted earlier this 
could also have been due to a declining velocity of money. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the 
imminent threat of an exponential monetary expansion once export revenues surge. 
 
The final analyses we undertake is the level of misalignment of the BRER to its Permanent Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate. We apply the calculation suggested by Lebdaoui (2013) whereby the misalignment is 
the percentage difference between the BRER and the trend component of the BRER extracted using 
the Hodrick Prescot filter. We observe that for the most part the real purchasing power of the 
Ngultrum is overvalued. This is perhaps in part due to the nominal peg between the rupee and the 
ngultrum which has in part financed increasing imports. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
Data and Estimation Issue 
While we have attempted to present a comprehensive appraoch, there are numerous issues that we 
need to take into consideration. First, although we have been able to draw on a longer time series 
than was available to our predecessors, 32 observations is still a significant limitation in deriving 
estimates that are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of parameters. Nevertheless, the scope of the 
assignment is to arrive at some general and crude estimates to steer discussion in an objective and 
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systematic manner. We also draw attention to the possibility of structural breaks in the series given 
that for a small economy, disruptive changes are more common and can have a level-changing impact.  
We are also unable to test for more complicated autoregressive functional forms due to the limited 
time series. For instance, there would definitely be a lagged effect on the BRER of numerous factors 
as they take time to materialize. Moreover, we do not have adequately disaggregated data to capture 
lagged effects at smaller intervals. Besides real power exports and the lagged value of the exchange 
rate, the other parameters are not robustly significant to inclusion and exclusion of variables. 
As highlighted earlier that a significant proportion of inflation is imported from India, the WPI feeds 
into the CPI and hence some of the effects of the Dutch Disease may be diluted as well. This is 
particularly relevant since the domestic content of the CPI was only adjusted recently thereby masking 
some of the trends of increasing prices for non-traded services. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we attempted to diagnose the Dutch Disease for the hydropower-dependent economy 
of Bhutan. While we can derive a general trend of Bilateral Real Exchange Rate appreciation that is 
consistent with a Dutch Disease, we cannot unequivocally attribute this to hydropower export 
revenues. We also do not observe a contraction of the manufacturing sector as evidence of the 
‘resource movement’ effect and instead we observe a gradual increase which could be due to the 
power intensive nature of the sector in Bhutan. However, we cannot ignore the possibility that the 
manufacturing sector could have been larger in the absence of real exchange rate appreciation. As is 
the case in most countries where factor mobility is limited, we do observe the spending effect 
manifesting in the form of increased private absorption of power income. We also suggest that the 
resource movement effect in Bhutan probably unfolds in a slightly unconventional way in which more 
labour is absorbed by the public sector which is financed by hydropower revenue.  
However, we acknowledge that data and estimation issues constrain us from acquiring more robust 
and sophisticated empirical estimates. Regardless of the empirical results, we can intuitively forecast 
the implications of the imminent energy boom given its magnitude. Anticipating the associated risks 
and formulating countervailing mechanisms will be critical to prevent a full-blown Dutch Disease since 
the economy today is more monetized and integrated than when previous hydropower projects were 
commissioned. Strategies that range from establishing a stabilization fund to structural reforms that 
encourage diversification will be critical. Macro-prudential policies that also limit excessive 
speculation in real estate and consumption and instead nudge bank lending towards investment in 
other sectors will be critical.
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APPENDIX: ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
To capture movements in the Bilateral Real Exchange Rate we begin with the following specification: 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑒𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡−1) − 𝜌(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑠 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑑 ) + ∅𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡………………………………...... (1),  
Where e* represents the equilibrium BRER and e the actual BRER. The first term essentially captures 
the deviation of the previous period’s value from the equilibrium. Hence the parameter 𝜃 functions 
as an adjustment for any deviation. The second term models the impact of the monetary 
disequilibrium discussed in the earlier section, which is essentially a representation of excess liquidity 
also calculated as the gap between money supply and money demand. The final term that captures 
any devaluation of the nominal exchange rate would be 0 in our case given the peg between the two 
currencies. Hence, to understand changes in the BRER (e) we need to explore the evolution of the 
equilibrium BRER (e*).  
log (𝑒𝑡
∗) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 log ( 𝑋𝑡
𝑃) + 𝛾2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝑡
𝑁) + 𝛾3 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡) + 𝛾4 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜏𝑡)………………………….….. (2) 
The determinants of the equilibrium BRER are expressed in terms of real power exports (xp), 
government expenditure on non-traded goods (GN), net foreign aid (ODA) and import restrictions (𝜏𝑡) 
which is set to 0 as trade restrictions with India are virtually non-existent. While Naoko includes the 
power tariff and power volume separately we feel that the dynamics of both can be consolidated in 
the real power exports variable. All the stated variables are expected to have a negative impact on the 
dependent variable, or in other words they result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
To econometrically model the evolution of the behaviour of BRER we combine the equations 1 and 2.  
(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡−1) =  𝜃(𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋𝑡
𝑃 + 𝛾2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛾3 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡 −𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡−1) − 𝜌(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑠 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑑 ) 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  𝜃𝛾0 + 𝜃𝛾1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋𝑡
𝑃 + 𝜃𝛾2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑡
𝑁 + 𝜃𝛾3 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡 +(1 − 𝜃)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 − 𝜌(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑠 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑑 ) 
This yields the econometric specification: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡 = 𝜎0 + 𝜎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑡
𝑃 + 𝜎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑡
𝑁 + 𝜎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡 + 𝜎4𝑒𝑡−1 − 𝜌(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑠 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑑 ) + 𝜀𝑡… (3) 
Where the 𝜎𝑖 =  𝜃𝛾𝑖  and 𝜎4 = (1 − 𝜃) and 𝜀𝑡 is an error term. The specification allows us to capture 
the longer term as well as shorter term determinants of real exchange rate behaviour. However, we 
must also estimate the long run demand for money equation to derive the unobserved monetary 
disequilibrium. The long run demand for money can be captured by the following 
[
𝑀
𝑃
]
𝑡
𝑑
= 𝛽1𝑦𝑡
𝛽2exp (−𝛽3𝑖𝑡)……………………………………………………………………….. (4) 
Where the dependent variable is the real demand for money expressed in terms of real GDP adjusted 
for inflation. Since the variables are integrated of order 1 we use the Johansen co-integration test to 
derive the co-integrating equation that describes long run demand for money. The co-integration test 
reveals that 1 co-integration equation exists. This results in the following estimated parameters: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡−1
𝑑 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2log (𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝)𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡−1 
Where𝛽1 = 5.82, 𝛽2 = 1.55 (0.05), 𝛽3 = −0.07 (. 008) . 
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With the estimated money demand equation we can derive the monetary disequilibrium in our 
primary regression equation 3. 
 
 
